As Slavoj Žižek is fond of repeating, the contemporary threat against pleasure does not come from its proscription but from the insistent, pervasive injunction to enjoy, which poisons pleasure at its root by turning it into a social obligation (reflected in the injunction that for the good of the economy, consumers have a duty to consume, if necessary beyond their means.) It is in this context that Matissean aesthetic pleasure came to seem a quaint notion. In a culture of immersive, obscene scenography (as Giuliana Bruno has called it), the pleasure of the visual has been enfeebled by surfeit. What could abstraction deliver to a culture already mainlining ever-more potent synthetic visual stimulants?
It seems odd, therefore, that this rhetoric of visual pleasure should be so prominent in the discourse that sustains abstraction. All the more so in that abstraction originated in a milieu in which its formal operations were understood as performative gestures laden with radical political meaning.
The notion of abstraction as a purely formal project was a fiction invented by Clement Greenberg who in the guise of safeguarding abstraction from the encroaching miasma of totalitarian kitsch performed a Stalinist airbrushing of its history that disconnected it from the explicitly revolutionary aims that were the source of its greatest intensity. Deprived of this connection, which is to say deprived of its traction in the social field, abstraction could not but degenerate into a symptom of the vapidity of a spectacular capitalist culture, mirroring that culture’s endless generation of dazzling surface effects that give the system the appearance of constant mutation while hiding the brute constancy of capital’s impoverishment of everyday life. We begin with Malevich—whose Black Square (1915) originated as backdrop for the Futurist opera Victory of the Sun (thus forging an originary link between the nonobjective and the performative) and after the October revolution would become an icon of the militant erasure of author and of both compositional and class hierarchy—and end up with what at the beginning of the ‘80s, Benjamin Buchloh dismissed as Frank Stella’s “corporate brooches,” an oeuvre paradigmatic of the straining after formal novelty to which this depoliticized abstraction condemned itself.
What Greenberg did not foresee, is that in reducing modernism to a depoliticized aestheticism he guaranteed it’s occlusion by the very machinery of kitsch production that he claimed to be defending it against, since the generative power of this machinery (which Greenberg failed to appreciate) far exceeded that of the bohemian brotherhood Greenberg designated as the avant-garde. Trapped in the formulaic equation of kitsch with industrialized academicism, he failed to register (as Marcel Duchamp had) that the industrialization of design, communication, and entertainment amounted to the industrialization or automation of formal innovation itself. The abolition of content and the fetishizing of form would come to be realized in their most extreme form in bourgeois ideology wherein even politics would be subsumed into formal discourse (“perception is reality”). Far from providing a basis for avant-garde autonomy, Greenberg’s depoliticization of the avant-garde facilitated modernism’s convergence with the capitalist spectacular economy. Within this economy, aesthetics reigns supreme, reducing all discourse to an argument over style and history to a succession of makeovers, each of which, whether it be the latest flavor of toothpaste or a focus-driven retooling of a presidential image promises to be revolutionary—a formal rupture—but whose accumulation is the tedious iteration of the same hegemonic frame that is the limit of the discourse.
Greenberg’s enduring legacy in the arts, rarely acknowledged as such, is the belief that the meaning of art works resides “inside their edges” to use Abigail Solomon-Godeau’s apt phrase. Certainly, as Malevich made explicit by proposing Black Square as a negation of the visible and not merely a withdrawal from it, abstraction’s refusal of representation was not an assertion of the autonomy of the nonobjective work but, quite the contrary, an indication that the nonobjective derives its meaning from the discourse (as opposed to the individual) that authorizes it. This is what enabled the black square motif to germinate as a stage backdrop, be realized as several paintings, and also circulate as an agitprop emblem among Malevich’s radicalized students. It was only when the discourse that gave abstraction its allegorical or performative function was repressed that the discourse of beauty became its default and specious support. (Black Square is exemplary in that when removed from its historical moment it reverts to a dumb, unbeautiful object whose materiality is almost repellent, the corpse of a signifier.)
Abstractions refusal of mimesis was always registered by the naive bourgeois public as a species of dereliction or shirking of the proper labor of art—a suspicion that abstraction’s formalist apologists have countered by harping on the arduousness of invention and formal rigor: the by now familiar refrain of “It looks easy, but it’s not.” In case the Philistines demanded proof of competence, there were always Mondrian’s paintings of trees (and numerous other representational works by abstractionists) on hand to supply it.
But I think the naïve public was on to something that got closer to what was radical about abstraction: its refusal of the bourgeois work ethic. This refusal is sometimes flaunted (as in those early abstract collages of Jean Arp whose titles assert—against the visual evidence of their careful construction—that they were composed according to the laws of chance); it is often unremarked; and just as often only manifest negatively, as a straining after virtuosity. That abstraction makes possible almost effortless production is a secret that its institutionalization required to be suppressed. In the case of the monochrome, which is the one abstract genre where this secret practically leaps from the surface, it is only by dint of the labor conspicuously expended on its finish or else the imputed conceptual rigor that informed its design that the monochrome can retain the authority required of institutionally validated art. Occasional succès de scandales, such as Giuseppe Pinot-Gallizio’s invention of Industrial Painting in the late ‘50s (whereby abstract paintings were created by the yard on an assembly-line basis by roller-wielding volunteers) or the activities of the French BMPT group later in the ’60, were exceptions that proved the rule, scandalous precisely by virtue of their indiscreetness. For the most part, as in the work of a number of artists in this show, discretion is maintained without the secret being actively suppressed. Whenever the aleatory is invoked (as in Lita Albuquerque’s Red Paintings) or dumb process becomes performance (as in James Hayward’s monochromes) the absence of labor is folded in the absence of authorship: These works made themselves, as it were.
Of course, to say that abstraction refuses to work is like saying of the fictional Alfred P. Doolittle, Eliza’s ne’er-do-well father in My Fair Lady, that he did little, when his doing little was an act of dissent (“I’m undeserving and I aim to go on being undeserving”). Abstraction’s mimetic poverty like Dolittle’s enforced idleness is most pointed when it performs itself as lack rather than what might compensate for the lack. “Keep moving, nothing to see here,” as the police are fond of saying. But who can resist seeing nothing?
Published: A version of this essay accompanied the exhibition, “Framing Abstraction: Mark, Symbol, Signifier,” at Los Angeles Municipal Art Gallery, Los Angeles, 2011